We conjecture that lenders' decisions to provide liquidity are affected by the extent to which they internalize any spillover effects of negative shocks. We show that lenders with a large share of loans outstanding in an industry are more likely to provide liquidity to industries in distress. High-market-share lenders' propensity to provide liquidity is higher when negative spillovers are expected to be stronger, such as in industries in which fire sales are more likely to ensue. Lenders with a large share of outstanding loans are also more likely to provide liquidity to customers and suppliers of industries in distress, especially when the disruption of supply chains is expected to be more costly. Our results provide a novel channel, unrelated to market power, explaining why concentration in the credit market may favor financial stability.
Introduction
Interconnections between different firms and industries are known to lead to propagation and amplification of shocks throughout the economy in a way that can drive aggregate fluctuations (Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) ). Interconnections may also lead to credit market freezes because lenders fearing poor firm performance if interconnected firms fail to receive credit may refrain from providing new loans (Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) ). This paper argues that the extent to which cascade effects due to interconnections propagate, and credit markets freeze, depends on the structure of the banking system and the lenders' share of the loans outstanding in an industry.
Our argument is the following. Negative shocks and industry distress often lead to asset fire sales. Through this channel, negative shocks affecting one borrower may deplete the balance sheets of other firms in the same industry (Lang and Stulz (1992) , Carvalho (2015)). Shocks may also ripple through the supply chain (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) ; Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) ), magnifying the initial shock to the industry in distress through the disruption of input supply and demand. Ultimately, these spillover effects are expected to adversely affect the lenders of the industry in distress not only because the propagation of shocks may impair the value of the loans they have retained, but also because it may disrupt future business with firms in the distressed industry.
Lenders anticipate that fire sales and cascade effects along the supply chain are less likely to ensue if they directly or indirectly provide liquidity to firms affected by large negative shocks and distress. We hypothesize that a lender's decision to provide liquidity depends on the extent to which the lender internalizes any adverse spillover effects of negative shocks.
Lenders that issued a larger share of the loans outstanding in an industry, anticipating that liquidity provision will enable them to preserve future business, may thus have stronger incentives to provide credit in times of distress.
We find that lenders that have a large share of the loans outstanding in an industry in distress are more likely to initiate new loans to firms in that industry, especially if the industry is prone to fire sales, as proxied by the presence of industry-specific assets. We also find that lenders that are prominent providers of credit to an industry in distress are more likely to extend credit to firms upstream and downstream. These effects are largely driven by industries in which firms have strong relationships with their customers and suppliers. In particular, by propping up the distressed industry's customers, lenders may help to boost the sales of the distressed (upstream) industry, thereby mitigating fire sales and increasing borrowers' ability to repay their loans.
High-market-share lenders also provide credit to suppliers of distressed industries. Suppliers are more likely to experience negative liquidity shocks if downstream firms make late payments or default on their obligations. As a consequence, they may experience distress and even failure (Boissay and Gropp (2013) , Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) ). However, suppliers' financial health and continued provision of inputs and other products are important for the performance of their customers (Bernard, Moxnes, and Saito (2015) ; Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) ), especially if they are in industries with strong relationships along the supply chain. Thus, high-market-share lenders initiate new loans to suppliers of industries in distress to reduce shock propagation and amplification.
Overall, high-market-share lenders' liquidity provision along the supply chain stabilizes distressed industries. As we show, following distress, industries in which loan provision is more concentrated experience fewer bankruptcies. In addition, we find that these industries enjoy better long-term stock market performance, which suggests that bank lending behavior is at least on average efficient.
All of our results are obtained after absorbing bank-level supply and industry-level demand shocks using bank-time and industry-time fixed effects, respectively. Thus, our estimates capture the differential propensity of banks that are important to an industry to provide new loans in case of distress. We mitigate any lingering concerns that a lender's market share may be spuriously correlated with the lender's propensity to grant new loans by exploiting exogenous variation in industry market shares due to bank mergers, similarly to Favara and Giannetti (2016) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) . While in principle, high-market-share banks may be able to provide particular services and face greater loan demand from distressed industries, this is less likely to be the case if the market share is the result of recent mergers, as banks are unlikely to have acquired the expertise necessary to provide these services. Mergers are also unlikely to be driven by bank lending to particular industries in the syndicated loan market, as banks active in the syndicated loan market are very large and each industry in the syndicated loan market is small with respect to their balance sheets. It is therefore comforting that the instrumentalvariable estimates support the causal interpretation of our findings.
We also document a number of cross-sectional effects, which are consistent with the causal mechanism underlying our hypothesis. Banks are significantly more likely to lend to customers of distressed industries if these customers are less leveraged than firms in the distressed industry. In this manner, banks generate liquidity for their borrowers in the distressed industry without further increasing their leverage. We also find that banks lend more to customers of distressed industries if these customers are highly concentrated. Banks thus optimize the extent to which they internalize the externalities created by financial distress along the supply chain by focusing on strategically important firms.
Finally, we investigate alternative mechanisms that may lead to our findings. For instance, one may wonder whether a lender's share of the loans outstanding in an industry captures the exposure of the lender's portfolio to the industry (i.e., the industry's share of the bank's loan portfolio). As Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) and Loutskina and Strahan (2011) show, less diversified lenders may be better informed. Therefore, our measure of a lender's share of the outstanding loans in an industry could be related to an informational advantage, which may explain the lender's willingness to extend loans to borrowers in distressed industries.
While we do not deny that better information may enable lenders to internalize externalities, an explanation based on portfolio concentration and information asymmetry alone cannot account for the cross-sectional effects that we document. First, we find no evidence that a lender's portfolio exposure to an industry, a common indicator of banks' expertise, positively affects its propensity to extend new loans to borrowers connected to industries in distress. Second, if banks' liquidity provision was driven exclusively by an informational advantage, it would be hard to explain why banks are more inclined to provide liquidity to industries prone to fire sales, such as industries with more fixed assets. This is because the presence of fixed assets is generally associated with a lower degree of information asymmetry. Third, exogenous variation in market shares due to recent mergers is unlikely to capture lenders' informational advantage. Finally, we document that lenders provide liquidity to new borrowers in distressed industries, and not only to borrowers that they engaged with in the recent past and that they are expected to know better.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the banking literature. Existing work focuses on the effect of bank and relationship characteristics in the transmission of economic shocks. Typically, foreign banks are believed to be fickle lenders (Giannetti and Laeven (2012) ), while a close relationship with a bank guarantees stable funding when negative shocks occur (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2016) ; Liberti and Sturgess (2016) ). We recognize that bank lending decisions affect borrowers' health and may feed back to lenders' balance sheets. Some lenders -notably banks with a high fraction of the loans outstanding in an industry -may therefore take into account these feedback effects in their lending decisions.
This point is related to Favara and Giannetti (2016) , who show that lenders that have retained a high fraction of outstanding mortgages are more likely to renegotiate defaulting mortgages and, thus, mitigate the effects of negative shocks on real estate prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to recognize that the internalization of externalities may affect loan provision to distressed industries and along the supply chain.
Our paper also relates to the literature that explores the effects of bank loan concentration on bank-firm relationships (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) ), loan supply (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006)), and the transmission of monetary policy to mortgage rates (Scharfstein and Sunderam (2016) ). All of these papers study the effects of market power on loan contract terms. We focus, instead, on the role of concentration of the loans outstanding in an industry for lenders' incentives to provide liquidity during distress, a mechanism unrelated to market power. By showing that concentrated lenders are more prone to provide liquidity, we also present an alternative interpretation to the view that competition in the credit market erodes financial stability because it distorts lenders' risktaking incentives by lowering their profit margins (Keeley (1990) ).
Finally, we contribute to the literature on forced sales of real and financial assets (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Shleifer and Vishny (2011) ). Forced asset sales may reduce the value of collateral and impair the balance sheets of other borrowers (Benmelech and Bergman (2011) ). Our paper shows that when industry conditions are poor, certain lenders are more inclined to extend new loans, potentially mitigating the initial effects of forced asset sales.
Data Description and Variable Definitions
This section describes the construction of the dataset and the most important variables in our analysis. Our main data source is DealScan, which comprises transaction-level data on syndicated loans. We focus on all completed syndicated loans issued to publicly listed or privately held U.S. firms. While our most comprehensive sample period is 1990 − 2013, in some of our tests we focus on the period from 1997 to 2013, because we are able to identify relationships over the supply chain starting only from 1997. As is customary, we drop all public-service, energy and financial-services firms, and identify bank-industry lending relationships by focusing on the lead arrangers of syndicated loans. We hand-match each lead arranger to its respective bank-holding company.
We measure bank lending as the dollar amount of loans for which a bank serves as lead arranger. We proceed in this way, instead of apportioning the share of a loan provided to the various participants of a syndicated loan, because loan-share data have relatively poor coverage in DealScan. Our proxies, based on the total number and volume of loans originated by a lead bank, allow us to capture a bank's share of profits in different industries, which should ultimately drive a lender's incentives to internalize externalities. Therefore, they are the most suitable for our analysis. To mitigate any lingering doubts, we correlate the market share of a lender in an industry to the average share of the loan that it retains as a lead bank in that industry. We find no relation. As will be clearer later, this implies that considering actual loan shares (in $ amount) retained by a lead arranger would leave our findings unaffected (because this would be equivalent to multiplying the dependent variable by a constant).
Since our objective is to explore whether lender j's (past) market share in industry i affects its propensity to provide credit to firms in industry i at time t, we aggregate data at the bank-industry-time level ijt. The main reason for aggregating the loan-level information is that, as we will show, changes in the loan supply are mainly driven by changes in the number of loans that are issued. Thus, changes in the total amount of loans that are extended are a better proxy for changes in the supply of credit than changes in the amount of each loan that has been granted. We aggregate the data at the half-year frequency in order to capture time-varying industry conditions. Using six-month periods also allows lenders to react to industry conditions as it typically takes several months to issue a syndicated loan.
To detect industry distress, we consider historical industry stock returns. In the spirit of Opler and Titman (1994) and Dinc, Erel, and Liao (2015) , we define Industry distress it−1 as a binary variable that takes the value of one if industry i experienced a cumulative median stock return of less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1.
Our conjecture is that banks' incentives to internalize potential externalities derive from their share of the loans outstanding in an industry in distress. We define Market share ijt−2 as the proportion of bank j's total loan volume granted to industry i over the aggregate loan volume of industry i. Both the bank's and the industry's loan volumes are measured over the previous six years (that is, the previous six-month periods from t − 13 to t − 2), because syndicated loans' maturity is, on average, six years.
We contrast a bank's market share in an industry to the share of an industry in a bank's loan portfolio. The difference between Portfolio share of industry ijt−2 and Market share ijt−2 is the denominator. We define the former to be equal to the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j over the previous six years.
To focus on banks that have an interest in an industry, the sample is limited to bankindustry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years.
1 If a lender that satisfies this condition does not issue any loan to an industry in a six-month period, we include the observation as a zero-loan observation. Thus, our dataset comprises 48 observations (for each half-year from the first half of 1990 to the second half of 2013) for each bank-industry pair.
In order to test our maintained hypothesis that banks with a larger market share internalize any externalities created by financial distress, we also consider customer and supplier relationships. We identify customer-supplier relationships at the industry level using inputoutput tables from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), because contagion effects are known to spread beyond reliant suppliers and major customers to firms in their respective industries (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) ; Carvalho, Nirei, Saito, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2016)). The BEA provides annual tables for the use of commodities by industries, before redefinitions (producers' prices), for 71 summary industries for the period from 1997 to 2013, which constrains our sample period. We match the BEA's input-output tables with information about borrower firms in the DealScan database. To do so, we translate the BEA's industry codes to SIC codes, available for each borrower in DealScan, using a conversion table attained from the BEA.
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For each one of the 71 BEA industries, we identify suppliers and customers of an industry as the top supplier and customer industries, respectively, other than the industry itself.
While a large component of supplier-customer relationships may occur within the same industry, other mechanisms, such as the desire to avoid fire sales, may induce high-market-share lenders to provide credit to the industry in distress. Therefore, to isolate lending to supplier and customer industries for the purpose of stabilizing a distressed industry through its sup-1 Results would be similar if we included all bank-industry pairs, but this would yield a larger number of zeros in our dataset. 2 https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html ply chain, we consider the top supplier and customer industries other than the distressed industry.
When we explore banks' liquidity provision over the supply chain, we measure supplier and customer distress as well as a lender's market share in, or portfolio share of, the industries of the main suppliers and customers using variables defined analogously to Industry We differentiate industries along a number of dimensions. First, we conjecture that if banks indeed internalize externalities arising from industry distress, they should have stronger incentives to initiate new loans if the industry is prone to fire sales. This is more likely to be the case in industries with less redeployable assets. We use two alternative measures of asset specificity.
Our first measure follows Kung and Kim (2016) , who use the 1997 BEA capital-flow table which breaks down expenditures on new equipment, software, and structures by 180 assets for 123 industries. We define Specific i as a time-invariant indicator for whether the industry in question is among the bottom-quintile industries in terms of asset redeployability. In addition, we define a second proxy for asset specificity, Specific (alternative) it , as a timevarying indicator for whether the industry in question is among the top-quintile industries in terms of its ratio of machinery and equipment to total assets in year t. This proxy is widely used in the literature to capture asset redeployability and to measure how prone an industry is to fire sales (see Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) ).
Second, high-market-share banks' incentives to initiate new loans to customers and suppliers of industries in distress should depend on the extent to which customers and suppliers entertain close relationships, as defaults and other problems may cause larger costs in these industries due to the disruption of valuable relationships. To capture this empirically, we use the list of industries in Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008). We define Relationship industries i as an indicator for whether industry i and its customer or supplier industry are relationship industries. The intuition behind this classification, described in detail by Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008) and widely used in the literature, is that in industries that sell durable goods, firms are likely to interact repeatedly with their trade partners to provide maintenance and service. Therefore, service interruptions are expected to cause large costs.
Summary statistics.
In Table 1 , we present summary statistics for our main variables.
After merging the BEA input-output tables with industries borrowing in the syndicated loan market, as recorded in DealScan, our sample (from 1997 to 2013) includes 57 industries and 211 banks. Each industry, on average, obtains credit from 44 banks, whereas each bank, on average, covers 12 industries. Overall, our sample includes a total of 2,516 bank-industry relationships.
Our bank-industry-half-year structure includes observations associated with zero loans issued in an industry. We find that 21% of the 116,662 observations from 1990 to 2013 are associated with non-zero loans. In the whole sample, the average bank's market share in a given industry, and in supplier and customer industries is 2 to 3%.
3 There is, however, Finally, based on our definition of industry distress, about 21% of all observations are associated with industry-level shocks.
Empirical Methodology
Our objective is to test whether banks with a large market share in an industry are more inclined to extend loans to the industry, its suppliers, or its customers when the industry experiences distress. We start by exploring how bank j's propensity to lend to industry i in half-year t following industry distress varies depending on bank j's past market share in industry i. Therefore, our baseline regression specification is:
where the outcome, y ijt , is either the total loan volume that industry i attains from bank j in period t, or an indicator variable for whether bank j grants any loan to industry i in period t; Market share ijt−2 is bank j's market share of loans in industry i in period t − 2;
Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether industry i was in distress in period By absorbing any supply shocks affecting bank j and any demand shocks affecting industry i, our empirical framework allows us to identify the differential propensity of bank j to lend to industry i in distress (and industry i's customers and suppliers) using as control other banks with different market shares in the same industry i, as well as bank j's propensity to lend to other industries, not in distress, in which it has a similar market share. Thus, our fixed-effects structure allows us to exclude a wide range of alternative explanations, which could lead to a spurious correlation between a bank's market share and its lending decisions.
In Section 4.2, we introduce an instrumental-variable methodology to further address any lingering doubts.
Bank Lending to Distressed Industries
We now turn to our estimation results for bank lending to industries in distress, discuss their robustness, and present additional findings that shed light on the underlying mechanism. Table 2 The tendency of high-market-share banks to lend to industries in distress does not depend on the fact that certain banks lend more than others to all industries, as we include bankperiod fixed effects throughout the analysis. The effect is also not driven by industries in distress borrowing more, as our estimates are robust when we include industry-period fixed effects in column 2. The coefficient of interest on the interaction term Market share ijt−2 × Industry distress it−1 remains significant even after controlling for bank-industry fixed effects (column 3). The estimated coefficient on the interaction term capturing the propensity of banks with different market shares to lend to industries in distress is smaller, but it still implies a highly significant 9.9% (= 0.055 × 1.805) increase in the propensity to lend following a one-standard-deviation increase in Market share ijt−2 . Hereafter, we use the most conservative specification in column 3 -with bank-industry, bank-period, and industryperiod fixed effects -as our baseline specification.
Baseline Specifications
The higher propensity of banks with large market shares to lend to industries in distress appears to be driven by the number of new loans rather than by the size of each loan. In column 4, the interaction term Market share ijt−2 × Industry distress it−1 is not significant when we consider as dependent variable the individual loan amount, computed as the logarithm of the average size of the loans issued to an industry during period t. Thus, on average, lenders with high market shares do not grant larger loans when an industry is in distress in comparison to normal times. In contrast, we continue to find a higher propensity of high-market-share banks to lend to industries in distress if we use as dependent variable an indicator capturing any new loans granted to industry i by bank j during period t (column 5).
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This evidence is consistent with the idea that banks with a large market share in an industry provide liquidity to internalize the externalities of financial distress. However, bankfirm relationships could be closer in industries with higher loan concentration. Relationship banks are, in turn, known to be inclined to lend to their clients in distress (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2016)), even if they do not internalize any externalities. To evaluate the merit of this alternative explanation, in Panel B, we repeat the tests from Panel A, and exclude any loans granted by banks that entertained a relationship with the borrower.
For this purpose, we redefine the dependent variables to exclude loans to firms in industry i to which bank j lent in the previous six years. The remaining loans are unlikely to have been granted to borrowers with a close relationship with bank j. It still emerges that banks with a higher market share issue more loans to borrowers in distressed industries. This indicates that our findings are not driven by close relationships in high-market-share industries.
Importantly, this test also allows us to rule out another potential explanation for highmarket-share banks' propensity to lend to industries in distress. Troubled banks may have incentives to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets (Peek and Rosengren (2005); Giannetti and Simonov (2013)). Since high-market-share banks exhibit a higher propensity to lend to industries in distress even when we exclude current borrowers, their behavior cannot be driven exclusively by the desire to avoid the negative direct effect of firm defaults on their balance sheet.
Rather, banks lending to firms with which they previously did not entertain relationships appear to take into account the indirect effects of those firms' well-being on the industry, including current borrowers therein. As we discuss below, our evidence on banks' propensity to provide credit to the (non-distressed) suppliers and customers of industries in distress also lends support to the conjecture that banks internalize externalities.
In Panel C, we evaluate whether our results may be driven by the recent financial crisis.
Given the way we define industry distress, episodes of industry distress could be correlated with bank distress. This gives rise to the possibility that instead of providing liquidity to distressed industries, banks rebalance their portfolios towards their core activities (Giannetti and Laeven (2012)), in our case the high-market-share industries. A conservative way of ruling out such competing explanation is to omit the financial crisis -from 2008 until the first half of 2010 -from our sample. 6 In Panel C, our estimates remain invariant, implying that the financial crisis does not drive our estimates. Our findings that banks internalize externalities could, however, potentially explain why banks are found to rebalance to core activities when they experience distress.
Finally, we consider that high-market-share banks may be particularly suitable for granting loans which require additional non-loan services, such as loans related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Mergers and acquisitions may also be more likely to occur when industries are in distress and need to restructure, giving an alternative mechanism for why high-market-share banks may grant more loans to industries in distress. However, Panel D shows that excluding loans related to M&A activities leaves our results qualitatively and quantitatively invariant, indicating that the propensity of high-market-share banks to lend to distressed industries is unlikely to be driven by the fact that these banks are able to provide specific services and, thus, face higher demand for credit when industries are in distress.
Exogenous Variation in Market Shares due to Bank Mergers
The economic mechanism we propose is that the higher propensity of high-market-share banks to grant loans to industries in distress is driven by their desire to avoid potential externalities stemming from defaults and more firms entering dire straits. We do not deny that banks may know better the industries in which they have higher market shares. While their knowledge may be a prerequisite for lending in times of distress, we argue that banks are more inclined to provide liquidity if negative shocks may cause externalities.
In this subsection, we introduce an instrumental-variable methodology to address this confound. In the next subsection, we present additional cross-sectional evidence in support of our hypothesis.
To construct instruments, we follow Favara and Giannetti (2016) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) , and exploit mergers between banks that are active in the syndicated loan market. We detect mergers between any two banks in DealScan using the SDC M&A database in conjunction with any mergers that we identify through a LexisNexis news search.
Our instrument for Market share ijt−2 is defined to be equal to the sum of the two merging banks' historical market shares in industry i in t − 3, starting in period t − 2 which is when a merger between bank j and another bank is completed.
Our instrument is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction, because banks active in the syndicated loan market are very large and each industry in the syndicated loan market is likely to constitute only a small portion of the banks' balance sheets. Thus, it is not plausible that mergers occur because of the anticipation of fire sales in case of financial distress. In addition, our instrument captures variation in market shares arising from recent mergers, which are therefore unlikely to have led to an informational advantage or any particular expertise in providing services to an industry.
The first two columns of Table 3 display the first-stage results, and show that our instrument is highly statistically significant. Hence, there are no concerns about our instrument being weak. The last two columns of Table 3 present the second-stage estimates, using as dependent variables the logged total amount of all loans and an indicator for any loans granted (as in columns 3 and 5 of Table 2 ). The estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to using this instrumental-variable approach. The treatment effects are significant at the 8% and 7% level in columns 3 and 4, respectively.
Cross-sectional Effects
To provide more direct evidence on our proposed mechanism, we consider industries in which the negative externalities of distress are expected to higher because the respective industries are more prone to fire sales. Asset sales are more likely to result in fire sales in industries in which assets are less redeployable, as potential buyers in the same industry may be financially constrained when the industry enters distress.
In Table 4 , we re-estimate the specifications of columns 3 and 5 of Table 2, differentiating between industries with different propensities to fire sales. Consistent with our maintained hypothesis, we find that high-market-share banks' propensity to grant new loans to industries in distress increases in the industries' asset specificity. This is indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the triple-interaction term. The results are consistent when we use either an industry's low level of asset redeployability (columns 1 and 2) or an industry's high ratio of asset specificity, proxied by machinery and equipment relative to the industry's assets (columns 3 and 4), as alternative measures of asset specificity. These measures are widely used to capture an industry's propensity to fire sales.
Importantly, industries with high fixed assets and, thus, improved access to collateral are considered to be less subject to asymmetric-information problems (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988) ). Therefore, these results also attest to the idea that the effect of a bank's market share on loan provision to distressed industries is unlikely to be driven by an informational advantage.
Which Shocks Matter?
In most of our analysis, we consider an industry to be in distress if the median return in the industry during a six-month period is below −10%. Table 5 shows that our results are robust to a number of variations. For instance, in Panel A, we consider an industry to be in distress if the mean return, rather than the median return, is below −10%. Our results are invariant.
In the remaining panels of the table, we consider alternative definitions of shocks to shed further light on the mechanism leading high-market-share banks to provide credit to industries in distress.
If bank lending behavior is indeed driven by the desire to avoid negative externalities of distress, we would expect the high-market-share lenders' tendency to provide credit to industries in distress to be more pronounced after temporary shocks. In this case, industries are expected to recover and may be able to do so more promptly if they can avoid defaults and supply chain interruptions. Following permanent shocks, firm exit and radical change may be optimal and it is unclear that providing liquidity may benefit bank profits. Thus, to the extent that they are able to distinguish ex ante between permanent and transitory shocks, high-market-share lenders should not provide credit if the shocks are permanent.
In Panel B, we define as permanent shocks any drops in an industry's median return of 10% or more which persist over the following three years, i.e., the industry's median return is still below −10% three years after the initial distress period. We label all remaining episodes of industry distress as transitory. From our results, it is evident that high-market-share banks lend more to industries in distress only after transitory shocks. This suggests that high-market-share lenders support industries in distress only when they expect distress to be temporary. Therefore, their tendency to internalize externalities may benefit the economy.
Consistent with our findings in Panel B of Table 2 , high-market-share banks' behavior does not appear to be due to loan evergreening.
So far, we have shown how lenders react to systemic shocks that affect a large majority of firms in the industry and are, therefore, most likely to lead to negative externalities. In Panel C, we consider banks' lending decisions following more idiosyncratic shocks, which we define as six-month periods in which the average return of the top-three firms in an industry (in terms of their sales) is below −10%. This definition does not require any widespread industry distress. We find no evidence that high-market-share banks are more likely to grant new loans to industries in which a few firms experience distress. If industry distress is not systemic, we expect externalities to be less likely to ensue as other firms in the industry can purchase the ailing firms' assets and, thereby, expand their input demand and supply.
The evidence in Panel C lends further support to our maintained hypothesis that highmarket-share banks provide liquidity if industry distress is widespread and the intervention is, thus, necessary to avoid negative externalities.
Bank Lending to Customers and Suppliers of Distressed Industries
In this section, we consider banks' ability to internalize potential externalities from industry distress over the supply chain.
Main Results
Our evidence suggests that high-market share banks tend to internalize externalities within an industry in distress. However, externalities generated by financial distress are not confined to a given industry, but can also spread over the supply chain.
Supply-chain disruptions may have negative feedback effects on the balance sheets of lenders that are highly exposed to (customer) industries in distress. Firms in distress are likely to default on their suppliers, potentially leading to further defaults. The spreading of financial problems to upstream industries may worsen the problems of industries in distress, as firms are highly dependent on their suppliers. Therefore, high-market-share lenders may have an incentive to extend new loans to the suppliers of industries in distress in an attempt to limit the propagation of the initial shock and to avoid negative feedback effects on their balance sheets. Table 6 presents supporting evidence for this conjecture. In column 1, we find that banks that have a large market share in an industry (customer) in distress are more likely to grant new loans to the suppliers of that industry. The magnitude of the coefficient on Customer share ijt−2 × Customer distress it−1 is even larger than the corresponding coefficients in column 3 of Table 2 . As in Table 2 , the effect is driven entirely by new loans to the industry, i.e., the extensive margin (column 3) rather than the intensive margin (column 2).
Importantly, this result does not depend on the fact that distress is transmitted from customers to their suppliers, and that banks with a large market share in the customers' industry also have a large market share in upstream industries. In columns 4 and 5, we control for Market share ijt−2 × Industry distress it−1 to capture this effect. The magnitude of the coefficient on Customer share ijt−2 × Customer distress it−1 is invariant, and remains highly statistically significant.
High-market-share lenders may also be inclined to extend new loans to distressed industries' customers in order to prop up the demand for their clients' products. Also, since distressed industries may cut the amount of trade credit they are able to offer to their customers, liquidity provision to these industries may be particularly important to sustain demand. To test this, in Table 7 , we re-estimate all specifications from We conjecture that the effect of lenders' market shares on new loans to the suppliers and customers of industries in distress should be larger in relationship industries. In Table   8 , we find that this is indeed the case: in columns 1 and 2, the tendency of high-marketshare lenders to provide credit to the suppliers of industries in distress is highest when both customers and suppliers are relationship industries. Columns 3 and 4 show a similar tendency for the customers of industries in distress.
To Which Customers Do Banks Extend New Loans?
In the following tests, we explore the strategic dimension of banks' decision to extend new loans to distressed industries' customers. First, banks may decide to lend to a distressed industry or to its customers in order to maximize the effectiveness of their liquidity provision and at the same time to minimize costs arising from financial frictions and credit risk. For instance, extending new loans to an industry in distress may be particularly costly if such an industry already has high leverage, because situations of debt overhang may arise. In this case, indirectly providing liquidity to customers, which would increase their input purchases, may be optimal from a lender's point of view.
To explore this, we re-run the first three specifications of Table 7 , and add an interaction term with Relative leverage it , which is a ratio comparing the leverage of an industry's suppliers with the (customer) industry itself.
Our estimates in the first column of Table 9 show that high-market-share banks' tendency to lend to the customers of an (upstream) industry in distress is more pronounced if the industry in distress has high leverage in comparison to the customer industry. By providing loans to the customers, lenders can increase the sales in a distressed industry and, thus, provide liquidity without having to further increase its leverage and the financial frictions associated with high debt. As before, the effect is driven by the extensive margin (in column 3) rather than the intensive margin (in column 2).
In Table 10 , we provide further evidence for the strategic nature of banks' decisions to provide credit to customers of distressed industries. Namely, we document that banks with high market shares are more likely to extend new loans to the customers of an industry in distress if these customers are highly concentrated. In this case, one or few loans are likely to generate large sales for the distressed upstream industry, while in dispersed customer industries many loans may be necessary, increasing lenders' cost of limiting contagion.
In summary, our evidence suggests that banks optimize their efforts to internalize externalities along the supply chain by focusing on strategically important customers.
Mechanisms and Alternative Explanations
In the following, we provide evidence that banks have economic incentives to provide liquidity to industries in distress, and discuss competing explanations for our findings, most notably the possibility that our findings may reflect banks' differential degree of diversification.
Bank Competition
Banks may be more inclined to support industries in distress if they earn, or anticipate to earn, higher rents in the future (Wilner (2000) ). The first two columns of Table 11 explore whether Market share ijt−2 captures varying degrees of competition for credit in (distressed)
industries, by relating our variable of interest to two measures of the average cost of loans in the respective industries.
In the first column, we use as outcome variable the logged average all-in-drawn spread of all loans granted to industry i by bank j 12 months after the industry shock. In the second column, we use as an alternative measure the total cost of borrowing, defined as in Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) . In the last two columns, we test whether the spread on future loans is higher when lenders have a high market share and the industry has experienced distress in the past 24 months, rather than 12 months.
In the first and third column of Table 11 , we do not find any evidence that loan spreads increase following credit provision to industries in distress. However, high-market-share lenders appear to charge higher total cost of borrowing, suggesting that these banks have economic incentives to lend to industries in which they have a larger market share, albeit not differentially so in times of distress versus normal times (columns 2 and 4). Thus, banks with higher market shares are more likely to provide loans to borrowers in industries in distress, but they do not alter the spread on these loans. Therefore, it does not appear that lenders'
propensity to support industries in distress is driven by their desire to extract even higher rents in the future.
Bank Diversification
Throughout this paper, we have interpreted the effect of Market share ijt−2 , Customer share ijt−2 , and Supplier share ijt−2 to depend on banks' ability to internalize externalities. However, banks' market shares in distressed industries may also be correlated with their informational advantage in extending loans to said industries.
In Tables 3 and 4 , we have already presented evidence suggesting that loan provision to distressed industries is unlikely to be driven by an informational advantage. In addition, Table 12 explores whether patterns similar to the ones we have highlighted so far emerge when we use a bank's Portfolio share ijt−2 . This measure is a proxy for the extent to which a lender's portfolio is exposed to a given industry, and is considered to be positively correlated with banks' informational advantage in extending loans to an industry (Acharya, Hasan, and
Saunders (2006); Loutskina and Strahan (2011)).
After re-estimating the regression specification in the third column of Table 2 as well as the ones in the first column of Tables 6 and 7, we find that Portfolio share ijt−2 does not positively affect the extension of new loans to borrowers in distressed industries, or to their suppliers and customers. This further corroborates the idea that our findings are driven by lenders' tendency to internalize the externalities associated with distress, and that the effects are tied to the proportion of loans outstanding in an industry rather than to banks' diversification.
Real Effects
To evaluate the economic consequences of the patterns in bank lending that we highlight in this paper, we examine whether a higher concentration of outstanding loans in an industry alleviates the consequences of distress.
To test this, we start by conjecturing that distress in industries with a high credit concentration is less likely to be associated with adverse real outcomes, such as bankruptcies. We estimate industry-level regressions at the half-year frequency, and use as dependent variable an indicator for whether there have been any delistings in industry i in period t. As before, we use as explanatory variable an indicator for industry distress, Industry distress it−1 . In addition, we define a measure of credit concentration, Market HHI it−2 , as the Herfindahl index of the banks' market shares in industry i over the previous six years, that is, from t − 13 to t − 2, analogously to Market share ijt−2 . This measure of concentration varies between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating higher concentration in the credit provision to an industry.
In the first column of Table 13 , periods of industry distress are associated with a 21-percentage-point increase in the probability of industry-wide delistings. However, this effect is attenuated in industries with a high credit concentration, as the coefficient on the interaction between Market HHI it−2 and Industry distress it−1 is negative and significant. The effect remains robust after including industry fixed effects in column 2. Conversely, the previously negative coefficient on Market HHI it−2 becomes insignificant, possibly because credit concentration does not vary considerably within industries over time.
The attenuating effect of credit concentration on industry delistings following distress is not only statistically but also economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in Market HHI it−2 of 0.124 corresponds to a decrease in the likelihood of industry-wide delistings by 4.76 (= 0.124 × 0.384) percentage points following industry distress, a large effect considering that the probability of delisting is 0.304 in our sample.
As delistings are longer-term consequences of industry distress, in columns 4 and 5, we double the horizon of our dependent variable from six months to one year after industry distress. The coefficients of the interaction term are virtually unaltered.
In columns 3 and 6, we use the market share of the top lender in industry i over the past six years as an alternative measure of concentration. Our results remain largely robust.
Fewer delistings in distressed industries are not necessarily efficient and may decrease an industry's overall performance, if they allow non-viable "zombie" firms to survive, as highlighted by Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) . To evaluate whether the behavior of high-market-share banks is efficient, we investigate whether the long-run abnormal performance of industries following distress is related to the level of credit concentration.
To this end, we adopt a calendar-time-portfolio approach (see Fama (1998)), using monthly industry stock returns. We build two portfolios for industries in distress that are in the top and the bottom quintiles of the distribution of the industry credit concentration over six years prior to distress, as captured by Market HHI it−2 . We estimate industry abnor-mal performance (alpha) using weighted least squares with weights that account for the fact that monthly returns are more precisely estimated when more industries enter the respective portfolios (see Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016)). Table 14 displays the long-run abnormal monthly returns (%) over three, five, and seven years for the two types of portfolios in the first two columns. The last column reports the abnormal return of a portfolio that is long in the top quintile of the credit-concentration distribution and short in the bottom quintile.
7
We find that industries in distress generally experience negative abnormal returns in the long run, but significantly less so if they have high levels of credit concentration (column 3).
The long-short difference amounts to approximately 4% (0.332% × 12) per annum over three years. After seven years, the long-short difference remains positive, at 3% (0.250% × 12) per annum.
This evidence complements our findings in Table 13 and suggests that industries with a high credit concentration experience fewer delistings following industry distress, and that the surviving stocks indeed outperform those in distressed industries with a low credit concentration. Thus, the behavior of banks in industries with a high concentration of outstanding loans appears to be efficient overall and to improve industry performance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that lenders' propensities to provide liquidity are affected by the degree to which they internalize potential feedback effects of negative shocks. We show that lenders with a larger share of the loans outstanding in an industry in distress are more likely to provide credit, especially if the industry has less redeployable assets, as fire sales are likely to ensue in case of firm defaults. Lenders with a larger share of outstanding loans are 7 Note that the alpha estimate in the third column is generally not exactly equal to the difference between the alpha estimates in the first and second column, because the number of industries in a given portfolio month is not constant across the two portfolios, for which we account by weighting observations as indicated in Appendix A of Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016).
also more likely to provide loans to suppliers and customers of industries in distress, and particularly so when the disruption of supply chains would be more costly.
Our results show that the concentration of outstanding loans impacts to what extent industry shocks are transmitted along the supply chain and become systemic. In this respect, we present evidence of a new channel, unrelated to market power, for why concentration in the credit market may enhance financial stability.
Bolton, P., X. Freixas, L. Gambacorta, and P. E. Mistrulli (2016): "Relationship Giannetti, M., and A. Simonov (2013): "On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro Notes: Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over the past six years (i.e., twelve half-year periods from t − 13 to t − 2). Supplier share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's supplier industry, measured over the past six years (i.e., twelve half-year periods from t − 13 to t − 2). Customer share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's customer industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's customer industry, measured over the past six years (i.e., twelve half-year periods from t − 13 to t − 2). Portfolio share of industry ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Portfolio share of supplier ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Portfolio share of customer ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's customer industry over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Customer distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's customer industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Specific i is an indicator for whether industry i is among the bottom 20% industries in terms of asset redeployability, as defined in Kung and Kim (2016) . Specific (alternative) it is an indicator for whether industry i is among the top 20% industries in terms of its ratio of machinery and equipment to total assets in year t. Relationship industry i is an indicator for whether industry i is a relationship industry, as defined in Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008) . Spread refers to the all-in-drawn spread. The total cost of borrowing is from Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) . Market HHI it−2 measures the credit concentration in industry i over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2, across all banks that provide credit to industry i in the sample described in Table 13 . Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1990 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. In Panels A, B, and D, the sample comprises the years 1990 to 2013. In Panel C, the sample omits the period from 2008 until (and including) the first half of 2010. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. In Panels A and C, the dependent variable in the first three columns is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the fourth column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. In Panels A and C, the dependent variable in the fifth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. For all dependent variables in Panel B, we additionally exclude the volume of all loans granted to firms in industry i to which bank j already lent anytime from t − 13 to t − 2 (relationship loans). As a result, we also drop observations in which all loans to industry i consist entirely of relationship loans. For all dependent variables in Panel D, we exclude the volume of loans with the following DealScan purposes, to which we refer as acquisition loans: "LBO," "MBO," "Merger," "Proj. finance," or "Takeover". As a result, we also drop observations in which all loans to industry i consist entirely of acquisition loans. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1990 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations, and it is limited to banks that merged with at least one another bank anytime during the sample period. The two first-stage regressions (for two instruments) are given in the first two columns. Merger-implied market share ijt−2 is equal to the sum of the two merging banks' market shares in industry i in t − 3 starting in period t − 2, which is when a merger between bank j and another bank is completed. The dependent variable of the second stage in the third column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. The dependent variable of the second stage in the last column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. We instrument this variable by Merger-implied market share ijt−2 . Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first and third column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. The dependent variable in the second and fourth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t−13 to t−2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. In the first two columns, Specific i is an indicator for whether industry i is among the bottom 20% industries in terms of asset redeployability, as defined in Kung and Kim (2016) . In the last two columns, Specific it is an indicator for whether industry i is among the top 20% industries in terms of its ratio of machinery and equipment to total assets in year t. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1990 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the fourth column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. The dependent variable in the fifth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. In Panel A, Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative average stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. In Panel B, Transitory shock it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1, but no longer below −10% after three more years. In contrast, Permanent shock it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1, and remained below −10% after three more years. In Panel C, Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative average stock return of the top-3 firms (in terms of sales) in industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1997 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first and fourth column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the second column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. The dependent variable in the third and fifth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Customer share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's customer industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's customer industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Customer distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's customer industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to (supplier) industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of (supplier) industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1997 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first and fourth column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the second column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. The dependent variable in the third and fifth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Supplier share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's supplier industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to (customer) industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of (customer) industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1997 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first and third column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. The dependent variable in the second and fourth column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Customer share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's customer industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's customer industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Customer distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's customer industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Supplier share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's supplier industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Relationship industries i is an indicator for whether industry i and its customer or supplier industries are relationship industries, as defined in Cremers, Nair, and Peyer (2008). Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1997 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the second column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. The dependent variable in the third column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Supplier share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's supplier industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Relative leverage it is the ratio between the average leverage of industry i's (distressed) supplier industry and the average leverage of industry i in period t. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1997 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable in the first column is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. In the second column, the dependent variable is the logged average size of loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t, and the sample is limited to non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t. The dependent variable in the third column is an indicator capturing whether any loans were granted to industry i by bank j in period t. Supplier share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume in industry i's supplier industry, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Customer HHI it measures the sales concentration of industry i as customers to their (distressed) suppliers in period t. Supplier HHI it measures the sales concentration of (distressed) suppliers to industry i in period t. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans from 1990 to 2013 granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to periods with non-zero loans granted to industry i by bank j. The dependent variable in the first and third column is the logged average all-in-drawn spread of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t + 1 (12 months after the industry shock) and in period t + 3 (24 months after the industry shock), respectively, where the all-in-drawn spread is the sum of the spread over LIBOR and any annual fees paid to the lender syndicate. The dependent variable in the second and fourth column is the logged average total cost of borrowing, as defined in Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) , of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t + 1 (12 months after the industry shock) and in period t + 3 (24 months after the industry shock), respectively. Market share ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume in industry i, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t−13 to t−2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous halfyear t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the bank-industry-half-year level ijt, based on the sample of all completed syndicated loans granted to industry i for which bank j served as a lead arranger in half-year t. Furthermore, the sample is limited to bank-industry (ij) pairs with non-zero loans in at least three half-years, whereas the remaining periods are included as zero-loan observations. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total volume of all loans granted to industry i by bank j in period t plus one. Portfolio share of industry ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Portfolio share of supplier ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to i's supplier industry over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Supplier distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's supplier industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Portfolio share of customer ijt−2 is the proportion of bank j's total loan volume to industry i's customer industry over the aggregate loan volume granted by bank j, measured over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2. Customer distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i's customer industry was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: The unit of observation is the industry-half-year level it. Furthermore, the sample is limited to industries with more than 50 non-zero loan observations across all bank relationships over 14 years from 1990 to 2013. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether there was any exit in industry i in half-year t (in the first three columns) or t + 1 (in the last three columns). We use the following CRSP delisting codes to identify exits: any type of liquidation (400-490); price fell below acceptable level; insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity; insufficient (or non-compliance with rules of) float or assets; company request, liquidation; bankruptcy, declared insolvent; delinquent in filing; non-payment of fees; does not meet exchange's financial guidelines for continued listing; protection of investors and the public interest; corporate governance violation; and delist required by Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Market HHI it−2 measures the credit concentration in industry i over twelve half-year periods (i.e., six years) from t − 13 to t − 2, across all banks that provide credit to industry i (in all columns but the third and sixth column). In columns 3 and 6, the measure of concentration is the market share of the top lender to industry i from t − 13 to t − 2. Industry distress it−1 is an indicator variable for whether the cumulative median stock return of industry i was less than −10% in the previous half-year t − 1. Public-service, energy, and financial-services industries are dropped. Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: Fama and French (1993) three-factor-model calendar-time portfolio estimates of alpha (in percent per month) are based on weighted-least-squares (WLS) regressions from 1990 to 2013 of the monthly premium of a given portfolio relative to the one-month Treasury rate (as dependent variable) on the monthly market premium, small minus big market capitalization excess return, and high minus low book-to-market ratio excess return. We form equal-weight portfolios of industries that in the past n years, where n varies from three to five and seven (across rows), had a cumulative median stock return of less than −10% in the previous half-year, and were in the top (first column) or bottom (second column) quintile of the distribution in terms of the industry-level credit concentration over six years prior to industry distress across all banks in a given industry (see definition of Market HHI it−2 in Table 13 ). In the last column, long-short portfolios are long in the top quintile of said distribution and short in the bottom quintile. N is the number of months with non-empty portfolios. Observations are weighted efficiently as a function of the number of industries in a given portfolio in month t, as in Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016) . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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